We develop and extend existing decision theoretic methods for troubleshooting a non functioning device. Traditionally, diagnosis with Bayesian networks has focused on be lief updating-determining the probabilities of various faults given current observations. In this paper, we extend this paradigm to include taking actions. In particular, we con sider three classes of actions: ( 1) we can make observations regarding the behavior of a de vice and infer likely faults as in traditional diagnosis, (2) we can repair a component and then observe the behavior of the device to in fer likely faults, and (3) we can change the configuration of the device, observe its new behavior, and infer the likelihood of faults. Analysis of latter two classes of troubleshoot ing actions requires incorporating notions of persistence into the belief-network formalism used for probabilistic inference. 3. Change the configuration of the system, observe behavior, and then repair components 1 The appropriateness of these assumptions is discussed in Beckerman et al. (1995). Decision-Theoretic Troubleshooting 125
Introduction
Given that a device is not working properly or a pa tient has some complaint, automated-diagnostic sys tems have traditionally been been designed to deter mine the set of faults or diseases that explain the symp toms [de Kleer and Williams, 1987 , Genesereth, 1984 , Heckerman et a!., 1992 , Breese et a!., 1992 . The di agnostician is able to ask questions about the behav ior of the device or test individual components in or der to determine if they are working properly. As new information is gained, the procedure updates its cur rent view of the world. Inference focuses on identify ing the set of faults consistent with the observations and, in the probabilistic case, assigning probabilities to the feasible diagnoses. Information gathering pro ceeds until a single cause has been identified or the current diagnosis is sufficiently restricted to support action .
From a decision making perspective, however, our pri mary objective is to repair the device or cure the pa tient, not just determine what is wrong. At any stage of the process, there are many possible observations, tests, or repairs that can be applied. Because these op erations are expensive in terms of time and/or money, we wish to generate a sequence of actions that min imizes costs and results in a functioning device (or healthy patient). In this paper, we develop a diag nostic procedure (i.e., planner) that selects the next best action by estimating the expected cost of repair for various plans. Because computation of the optimal plan is intractable, we develop procedures for estimat ing the expected cost of repair for plans that 1. Repair system components in sequenc� (with no observations) until the device is repaired 2. Gather evidence about the state of the system and then repair components
We use these cost estimates myopically to determine the next troubleshooting step. After each action, prob abilities are updated and a new set of potential plans are generated. This cycle continues until the device is working properly.
From the perspective of belief-network diagnosis, the second two classes of troubleshooting action are prob lematic. When we actively set (as opposed to passively observe) the value of a variable in a Bayesian network, previous observations regarding device behavior may change. For example, in Figure 1 depicting a simplified model of printing for personal computers, we may ini tially be unable to print over the network, but we are able to print after we set the print logic to print locally.
There is no mechanism in a single static Bayesian net work to combine the observations before and after this action. In this paper, we describe a notion called per sistence, and show how it can be used as a solution to this problem in the context of troubleshooting.
2
Basic Troubleshooting
In this section, we describe a set of assumptions under which it is possible to identify an optimal sequence of observations and repair actions in time proportional to the number of components in the device, with out explicitly constructing and rolling back a decision tree. The approach is described in . Let us suppose that the device has n compo nents c1, ... , en and each component is in exactly one of a finite set of states. We assume 1
1. There is only one problem-defi ning variable in the Bayesian network for the device. This variable represents the functional status of the device. One of the states of this variable must correspond to normal operation. In Figure 1 , the node labeled "Printer Output" is the problem-defi ning node. We will write e = normal to denote the ewmt that the problem defining node is normal.
2.
At the onset of troubleshooting, the device 1s faulty-that is the problem defining variable 1s observed to be faulty.
3.
Single fault: Exactly one component is abnor mal and is responsible for the failure of the de vice. We use P i to denote the probability that repairing component Ci will repair the device un der the current state of information I, that is Pi = Pr(e = normallrepair(ci), I That is, we first observe component c1 incurring cost Cf. With probability p 1 , we find that the component is faulty and repair it (and the device) incurring cost cr.
With probability 1-p1, we find that the component is functioning properly, and observe component c2. With probability p2f(l-p1), we find that c2 is faulty and repair it; and so on.
By reversing the order of the any two steps in the repair sequence, one can show that the minimum ex pected cost sequence is obtained by ordering the com ponents according to a decreasing probability to cost ratio. The expected cost of repair ECR(I) is under stood to be that under the component ordering where
We sequentially repair or replace the components ac cording to the ordering of their p;fCt ratios. After each repair, we observe whether the device is working properly, and if so, terminate.
Including unobservable components in this approach is straightforward. Recall that an unobservable compo nent c; is simply repaired with cost C[. Therefore, an unobservable component acts just like an observable component that is observed with cost C[ and always found to be faulty and repaired with cost zero. Con sequently, we can include unobservable components in 
Computing Probabilities of Faulty

Components using Persistence
When troubleshooting under uncertainty, we need to compute the probabilities that components have failed. In our approach, we compute these probabilities using a Bayesian network. Given the observation that ''Print Output" is false, we can use a Bayesian-network infer ence algorithm to compute the probability that any or all of the system components are faulty. When we wish to recalculate probabilities given a component of the device has been repaired, updating procedures must account for the change in underlying state of the de vice and the fact that previous observations may have been invalidated.
Consider the simple causal relationship between the status of a computer's connection to the network ("Net"), which we model as having states normal or abnormal, and the appearance of the printer icon in the print manager ("Icon"), which we model as having
Figure 2: (a) A Bayesian network for the interaction between net connections and print icon appearance. (b) A persistence network for determining the proba bility that the print icon will appear normal after we verify net connectivity, given that the icon is currently greyed out.
states normal and grey. The two nodes are dependent as depicted in the Bayesian network in Figure 2a .
Now suppose we observe the icon to be grey, and we want to determine the probability that the icon will be normal, after we make sure the network is connected. We can do so, using the Bayesian network shown in Figure 2b . In this network, "Netpre" and "Netpo•t" represent whether or not the network is connected, re-spectively before and after we establish connectivity .
Similarly, "Iconpre" and "lconpa.t" represent whether or not the icon is normal before and after we connect the network, respectively . The node mrcon repre sents all of the possible mappings between "Net" and "Icon". Following Heckerman and Shachter ( 1995),
we call mrcon and its corresponding variable a map ping node and mapping variable, respectively. We call the remaining nodes and their corresponding variables domain nodes and domain variables, respectively. Table 1 , the mapping node mrcon has four possible states: (1) ok, where the icon is grey if and only if there is no network, (2) stuck on grey, where the icon is grey regardless of state of the network, (3) stuck on normal, where the icon is always normal, and (4) backwards, where the icon reads grey if and only if the network is connected. The node "lconpre" is a deterministic function of its cause "Netpre" and the node mrcon, as indicated by the double ovals around the node "Iconpre". For example, if "Netpre" is abnor mal and mlcon is backwards, then "Iconpre" will be normal. The node "Iconpost" is the same determin istic function of cause "Netpost" and the node m1con·
As shown in
The uncertainty in the relationship between "Net" and "Icon" is encoded in the probabilities for the node mrcon· These probabilities are constrained by, but not necessarily determined by, the probabilities in the Bayesian network.
By using a single node m1con to represent the map pings between "Network" and "Icon" both before and after the action is taken, we encode the assertion that the mapping (or mechanism) between cause and ef fect is not affected by actions that may change the cause. Although we are uncertain about which map ping holds, representing this uncertainty in a single node enforces the assertion that the mapping persists across the action. We could equivalently have two mapping nodes, one for before and one for after the action, with an arc between the two. The state transi tion distribution for the mapping variables in this case would encode the restriction that the state of the map ping variable after the action is the same as the state before the action.
In order to calculate the probability that the icon will be normal after establishing network connectivity, we set "Netpo•t" to state normal and set "lconpre" to state grey in the network in Figure 2b . We then apply a standard belief network inference algorithm to to the network to calculate the probability that "Iconp o•t" :::: ::
normal.
We refer to this notion as causal persistence. Causal persistence is closely related to Heckerman and Shachter's ( 1995) concept of unresponsiveness. The 1994) . Related notions are discussed in Pearl (1993), Goldszmidt and Darwiche (1994) , and Balke and Pearl (1994) .
In general, suppose we have a Bayesian network for a set of domain variables U = { x1, .. . , Xn }· Further, suppose that we want to answer questions of the form:
"What would be the probability of X � U if we were to take some action, given that we now observe Y � U ."
To answer such questions, we construct a new Bayesian network as we did in our example. First, we copy the network, using the first and second instances of the network to represent the domain variables before and after we take the action. Second, we introduce mapping nodes m; for each domain node x;, and as sess the prior probabilities of these nodes. Typically, these mapping nodes will be mutually independent, but they need not be [Beckerman and Shachter, 1 995] .
Also, note that if x; is a root node, then m; = x; and we do not need to explicitly create the mapping node.
Third, we make both versions of node x; the same deterministic function of its parents and m;. Finally, we identify those domain nodes in the post-action net work that are affected directly by our action, break the arcs from their parents, and set the states of these nodes to their val ues as determined by our action.3
Under this construction, as in our example, the shared mapping nodes encode causal persistence. We refer to Bayesian networks constructed in this manner as per sistence networks.
2.2
Single-Copy Approximation: Repair
Although a persistence network is a correct represen tation of the effects of actions, we are still left with the problem that a persistence network often contains many undirected cycles, making inference computa tionally expensive. In this section, we describe an ap proximation wherein the repair probabilities can be computed without copying the original Bayesian net work. This approximation relies on representing the behavior of the device using a form of causal indepen dence (see, e.g., Srinivas [1993] and Beckerman and Breese [1996] ).
The notion of causal independence is illustrated in Fig   ure 3 . The effect of set of causes c1, . . . , en on an effect 3In doing so, we assume that the direct effects of actions are deterministic. The more general case can be handled with influence diagrams in canonical form (Beckerman and Shachter, 1995] . e are modeled in terms of a set of mediator variables e � , ... , e � and a function f ( e� , ... , e�). The mediator variables are dependent on their associated causes Ci, and serve as inputs to the function f. The choice off is arbitrary, in general, though in many applications it is an or relationship, where the effect is abnormal if any of the causal inputs is abnormal. Typically, we also designate one of the causal inputs as a "leak" cause that is always set to its abnormal state. Note that, for purposes of troubleshooting as described in Section 2, the leak causes are summarized as a single "all other" fault that can be repaired at a fixed cost with a service call, as discussed in [Heckerman et al., 1995] .
Suppose our device satisfies the following conditions:
( 1) the interaction between the n components of the device c1, .. . , Cn and the output of the device e satisfy causal independence, and (2) the function f has the property that the output is normal if all inputs are normal. For example, the noisy-or relationship and the noisy-adder relationship (with 0 corresponding to Normal) satisfy these conditions. If we impose these restrictions, and we assume there is a single component that is faulty, Heckerman et al. (1994) show that
Pr(epost = NormaliRepair(c;), epre = Abnormal, I) = Pr(e;,pre = Abnormaljepre =Abnormal, I)
That is, the probability that the effect is normal after stuck on normal backwards abnormal normal abnormal normal normal normal normal grey the repair is equal to the probability that the associ ated mediator node is abnormal in the original net work. For many troubleshooting domains, we have used the right-hand-side of Equation 1 in place of the left-hand-side as an approximation, because the right-hand-side may be computed without copying the Bayesian network for a device. Given the observation that e is abnormal, the single-fault assumption is likely to be true, because it is unlikely that two components of a device will fail at the same time. We rescale the probabilities for the nodes e� , so that the sum over the probabilities of all non-normal states of all nodes e� is equal to one.
2.3
Nonbase Observations
In Section 2, we considered two special classes of ob servations: (1) the observation of the problem-defining variable after a repair is made, and (2) the observation of a component before a repair is made (as part of an observation-repair act ion). We refer to these obser vations as base observations. In many situations, we want to be able to make more general observations.
For example, when our car fails to start, we may want to check the radio or the headlights in order to check the status of the electrical system. In this section, we describe a method for making such general observa tions.
Let us suppose we have m nonbase observations o1 , o2, .•. , Om available to us. We assume that obser vation o; can take on exactly one of r; possible states. We write o; = k to indicate that observation o; takes on state k. First, we use the procedures described in Sections 2 to generate a troubleshooting sequence con sisting of only base observations and repairs. Second, we imagine that we make observation o; first, and then By setting the configuration node to one value or the other, we isolate part of the system for inspection.
To further motivate the scenario, consider a failure in printing from your PC to a network printer. In gen eral, the problem could be local to your PC or some where in the network. We can try to print locally. If this action succeeds, then it rules out a host of prob lems associated with the local configuration. If this action fails, it will increase the probability of a local malfunction. Though changing configuration appears to be most compelling in troubleshooting hardware or other man-made devices, the notion is also relevant for medical diagnosis. For example, a physician diag- To incorporate this type of reasoning into our frame work, we need two elements. First, we need to cal culate the updated fault probabilities, given we set a configuration parameter and then make an observa tion. Because we are combining information from two situations-the first with the configuration parameter set in its original position and the second after the change-we will use a persistence network. Second, we need to use these updated fault probabilities to es timate the expected cost of a plan that starts with a configuration change. We will describe the cost esti mation framework first, and then discuss calculation of the necessary probabilities.
Our framework is as follows. In most cases, a configu ration node can be treated like any other non-base ob servation (see Section 2.3) in that we may recommend that the current state be observed without necessarily setting it to another state. In addition, we allow the where c• is the cost of changing the configuration from its current state to a new state and back. In the course of troubleshooting, we evaluate this expression for each possible configuration-observation pair, 4 and recom mend that configuration-observation pair that has the lowest expected cost.
3.1
Calculating Probabilities after a
Configuration Change
As mentioned, we need to calculate the probability of the faults given we have set a configuration variable to some value and then made some observation. We use a persistence network to perform this computa tion. As discussed in Section 2.2, we will again rely on causal independence as a representation of the de vice's operation. Here the motivation is not to allow 4The observation can be restricted to the problem defin ing node, if desired. a single-copy approximation, but to reduce the state space of the mapping nodes needed in the persistence network. Causal independence imposes a special struc ture on the mapping nodes associated with an effect node. Specifically, there is a single mapping node as sociated with each cause to mediator link and these mapping nodes are mutually independent.
The first step is to convert the original Bayesian net work into a causal-independence representation with mediator nodes. This conversion was applied to the network of Figure 4 and is shown in Figure 5 . We then create mapping nodes for each non-root non deterministic domain variable as shown in the upper left-hand-corner of Figure 6 . We then copy all nodes in the original network-except the component nodes and include a new node that represents the configu ration after the change. We do not copy the com ponent nodes, because we assume their states persist after the configuration change. The result is shown in Figure 6 . Finally, we copy the parent-structure and probability /function tables of the copied nodes to their corresponding copies.
The network in Figure 6 is used to evaluate the prob abilities used in Equation 2. We retain all current observations in the original (upper left) portion of the network, presumably including the fact that the prob lem defining node is abnormal. We set the configura tion node in the "post" network to a possible value, and perform probabilistic inference using the network to obtain Pr(oi,po�t :::: klcj,po•t = m, Ipre) for each pos sible observation o;,po�t = k. We then compute the fault probabilities of the components for every possi ble non-base observation. We use these probabilities to calculate the various repair sequences and associ ated expected costs of repair as described previously.
Finally, we repeat this entire set of computations for every possible state of the configuration node other than its current state. Note that if there are multi ple configuration nodes and we hypothetically set the value of one configuration node, the value of the other configuration nodes must remain the same from the "pre" to "post" network, even if we do not know their values.
3.2
Single-Copy Approximation:
Configuration
An approximation can be undertaken to avoid the use of the persistence network for the computation of the In terms of computational overhead, the primary fac tors are the increased size of the persistence network relative to the original network and additional infer ence steps needed for configuration recommendations.
For the printing problems network (Figure 1 ) and the configuration network (Figure 4) , the size of the join tree inference representation and propagation times for the persistence networks were roughly twice that for the standard single copy versions. We need a num 
Empirical Results
In previous work , we devel oped a Monte-Carlo technique for estimating trou bleshooting costs for a given planner and domain. We used a Bayesian network for a given device to generate a relatively large set of problem instances where one or more fa ults are known to have occurred. This study showed that the decision-theoretic troubleshooter had lower expected costs of repair than a static cost-based procedure, and also performed well in situations where there were multiple fa ults.
We performed a similar simulation study to verify the performance of the configuration planner versus a planner that did not suggest configuration changes.
We applied each algorithm to the printing network shown in Figure 1 . The planner that suggested config uration changes had an average time to resolution of 13.4 minutes, while the average time to repair for the planner that did not suggest configuration changes was 14.4 minutes. Of course, the magnitude of savings in a particular application depend on the cost and proba bilities in that domain. For a domain such as printing problems where are there are millions of incidents per
year, even the modest savings estimated here can re sult in a substantial total time or dollar savings.
Summary
We have developed a system fo r decision-theoretic troubleshooting where in a system can choose among several classes of possible actions-repairing a compo nent, making a passive observation, or changing the configuration of the device and making an observa tion. We have developed approximations in the con text of a myopic cycle for determining the best course of action. An important component of this work has been to show how to use the concept of persistence to compute the probabilities of events after repairs and configuration changes have been made.
